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Abstract. End-to-end encryption has been heralded by privacy and security re-
searchers as an effective defence against dragnet surveillance, but there is no evi-
dence of widespread end-user uptake. We argue that the non-adoption of end-to-
end encryption might not be entirely due to usability issues identified by Whitten
and Tygar in their seminal paper “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt”. Our investiga-
tion revealed a number of fundamental issues such as incomplete threat models,
misaligned incentives, and a general absence of understanding of the email ar-
chitecture. From our data and related research literature we found evidence of
a number of potential explanations for the low uptake of end-to-end encryption.
This suggests that merely increasing the availability and usability of encryption
functionality in email clients will not automatically encourage increased deploy-
ment by email users. We shall have to focus, first, on building comprehensive
end-user mental models related to email, and email security. We conclude by
suggesting directions for future research.
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1 Introduction
Email was introduced in MIT’s CTSS MAIL around 1965 [46]. At this point privacy
was not a primary concern. Subsequently, STARTTLS [36, 25] led to the deployment of
opportunistic transport layer encryption for email transmission. Recently, more email
providers have started applying it by default, effectively protecting email privacy in
transit. However, email providers themselves, and those who might be able to hack into
the email servers, have full access to our email communication. End-to-end (E2E) en-
cryption by end-users would protect emails from access by email providers and hackers
too. Facilitating tools are readily available, including PGP/OpenPGP [4, 10, 9], PEM
[30–33], MOSS [13], PKCS#7 [26], and S/MIME [39–41] according to Davis [14].
However, they generally have minimal real-world application outside of specific use
cases.
The “Summer of Snowden” [23] has put digital security back in the limelight, and
there has been a slew of new proposals for facilitating E2E encrypted secure messaging
(e.g. DarkMail, LEAP, Pond, Mailpile, Brair), but there is, as yet, little evidence of mass
uptake of E2E email encryption. The question that remains is “Why is the use of end-to-
end email security so limited?” Previously, the poor usability of E2E encryption tools
was advanced as the most likely explanation [50, 44]. However, usability has improved
in the interim and this might no longer be the primary obstacle it used to be. Other
papers cite interoperability difficulties between different tools and technical problems
as contributing factors [34]. The research question we want to answer is: “which other
explanations, besides the previously highlighted problems, could explain the low uptake
of E2E encryption?” If other reasons exist, they will need to be addressed before we can
hope to increase the uptake of E2E encryption.
To explore other potential explanations, we need to consider more human related
than purely usability aspects because E2E email encryption is undeniably effortful.
Hence the user has to be convinced of the need for E2E encryption, and the rewards
that will accrue as a result [7]. Consequently, it makes sense to study end-user mental
models of email and email security; i.e. do users actually understand the threats to their
emails and do they know which particular threats could be ameliorated by means of
E2E encryption? Note that if users don’t have the correct mental models, or don’t have
any mental model of email architecture and potential threats at all, they are unlikely
to encrypt their emails. If this is so, then in addition to addressing the technical and
usability issues of email encryption, we will have to work on developing the correct
mental models, so that these can eventually lead to a desire to encrypt and subsequent
adoption. Some researchers have reported issues with respect to flawed end-user mental
models in other security related contexts: with respect to anonymous credentials [49],
wrt. firewalls [38, 15], wrt. warnings [6], and wrt. mobile security [29]. Thus it is very
likely, that similar issues wrt. mental models related to email, and email security, exist.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with lay people and a survey (containing
the same questions) with a class of computer science students because we chose to focus
on these two different groups to explore their respective end-user mental models. We
anticipated that their mental models would differ given their very different backgrounds.
In order to answer our research question, we proposed seven possible explanations
why people do not generally use E2E email encryption deduced from a natural pro-
gression from awareness, to understanding, to acting (Section 2). These seven possible
explanations were evaluated based on an analysis of the interviews and survey responses
as well as by examining related research literature in the context of usable security and
mental models (Sections 3 and 4). We confirmed six of the seven explanations. Obvi-
ously, in order to change the situation in the future towards more privacy protection in
email communication, all of these need to be addressed. We thus conclude the paper
by suggesting that future work focus on finding ways to address these different themes
(Section 5). Due to the general nature of our findings and proposals, we expect that
amelioration will apply equally to email communication and to other privacy-critical
applications.
2 Proposed Explanations
Here we provide a list of possible explanations for non-uptake of E2E encryption. To
generate these explanations we formulated a developmental pathway to adoption of
E2E email encryption. We identified seven different states starting with general, then
usability-related and then states related to interoperability and technology (see Fig. 1):
1. They do not have any awareness of privacy as a concern.
2. They are aware of the possibility of privacy violation of their emails but do not take
any action for a variety of different reasons, perhaps because it does not concern
them.
3. They know that the privacy of their emails can be violated but are not aware that
this can happen in transit or at the mail server side. They may subsequently attempt
to protect themselves against client-based threats, but do not use E2E encryption.
4. They know that the privacy of their emails can be violated in transit or at the mail
server side but they do not take any action because they fail to see the need to act.
5. They know that the privacy of their emails can be violated (transit/server) and they
want to prevent this but they do not know how to protect their emails against these
types of threats, i.e. that they should use E2E encryption. They lack the knowledge,
or have only partial knowledge.
6. They are concerned that the privacy of their emails can be violated (transit/server)
and they understand that they can use E2E encryption to prevent this, but they can’t
do it.
7. They are concerned that the privacy of their emails can be violated and they under-
stand that they can use E2E encryption to prevent this, and they are able to do it,
but still they have reasons not to — they get side-tracked for some or other reason.
Fig. 1. Progression Towards E2E Encryption Deployment
For each of these explanations we will examine the relevant research literature and
statements made by the participants in our study to see whether each is supported or
challenged.
3 The Study
We performed an exploratory study consisting of semi-structured interviews, and sub-
sequent qualitative analysis in order to identify users’ mental models of email security
and thereby to answer the question “Which of the Proposed Explanations for the Non-
Uptake of E2E Encryption Can be Validated?”. The research philosophy of this study
is interpretivistic [51]. This is typical for research carried out where explanations are
sought for activities in natural settings where we hope to make cautious generalisations
based on a study of a limited number of participants. The research approach is inductive,
seeking to construct theories by means of identification of patterns in the data [5].
From 2 to 6 December 20133, we performed 21 interviews in Glasgow, of whom 18
participants consented to having their interview recorded and transcribed. The partici-
pants were a convenience sample of students and staff at The University of Glasgow,
and were recruited through personal and social networks.
The questions in the study were based on several discussion sessions among the
authors. As there is no ‘one’ widely-accepted method for identifying mental models,
we decided to use both drawings with think-aloud and semi-structured interviews in
order to gather both types of data.
Both parts were tested in a pre-study. For the test run, the survey was given to six
people to fill in on paper, and the drawing tasks were also tried in-person with two
individuals, as well as generally asking around to get an impression of people’s frame
of mind. From the pre-study we became aware of unclear question framing. For the
study design we removed stickers with concrete threats (e.g. NSA, anonymous, viruses),
created a custom diagram to be used in the debrief, added think-aloud, updated the
way that questions were asked (e.g. specifically asking about security problems), and
reworked the stickers based on icons from Microsoft Outlook 2013.
For the interviews, first the participant received a warm-up exercise for think-aloud,
was handed the questionnaire, and then the questions were asked while the responses
were recorded over audio. They were debriefed afterwards. These question categories
were included in the study:
Free-hand drawing Participants were asked to draw the transmission infrastructure
and process that allows an email from a friend to arrive in their inbox. They were
asked if they would change the drawing if they were sending the email, or if the
email was sent by a bank.
Template drawing In the second stage, a sheet of stickers was given to the partici-
pants, and they were asked to make another drawing of the transmission infrastruc-
ture. They were told they did not have to use all stickers and that they could draw
additional items.
Security problems Participants were asked what security problems they were aware
of regarding email, who causes these problems, and where they are caused. They
were asked to mark the location where the problem takes place on the diagram
made from the stickers.
Security concerns They were also asked about their general level of concern around
the security problems of email that they mentioned, which problems they were most
and least concerned about (as well as the reason), and what coping mechanisms they
put in place to deal with the concerns they had.
3 We obtained ethical approval from the College of Science and Engineering at Glasgow Uni-
versity (#CSE01327).
Demographics Participants were asked whether they used webmail and/or a desktop
client, which email client they use, their occupation, sex, and age group.
Debriefing and Closing Remarks At the end of the study the interviewed participants
were debriefed about the true goal of the study.
Permission was requested for a transcript of the recording to be made and used in a
publication. They were also asked whether they were willing to take part in future
studies, and whether they would like to receive a copy of the paper resulting from
this research.
Participants were informed about the topic of the study (transmission of email),
but were not briefed about the precise goal of the study (determining understanding of
email security). Note that we did not mention the concept of end-to-end encryption to
the participants, nor did we suggest that they ought to encrypt their emails. They were
told that they could stop at any time, and that they would not be penalised in any way
for doing so when participating in any courses taught by the researchers.
The interview group consisted of 9 females and 12 males, with 7 individuals in age
group 18-24 and 14 individuals in age group 25-34. Of the participants, 8 used webmail,
11 used webmail and desktop email clients, and 2 weren’t sure.
In addition to the data collected from lay persons, we also wanted to collect data
from computer science students as they ought to have a better understanding of the
email infrastructure and the potential threats. However, due to resource limitations, it
was not possible to conduct and transcribe another twenty interviews, so we adminis-
tered a survey containing the same questions to a classroom context. We acknowledge
that this stoppes us from collecting individual think-aloud transcripts or speaking to the
students personally but we did gain valuable insights despite these limitations.
Both the survey and interview groups stepped through the same survey: the same
materials were used for both. The interviewer walked through all questions with the
interview participants. The classroom group completed the survey individually without
assistance.
The survey group consisted of 8 females and 16 males (1 blank answer), with 12
individuals in age group 18-24, 11 individuals in age group 25-34, and 1 individual
in age group 35-44 (1 blank answer). Of the participants, 13 used webmail, 8 used
webmail and desktop email clients, 3 used desktop clients, and one was not sure.
4 Results & Reflection
We performed a qualitative analysis of the results, based on an inductive approach, to
determine which of the explanations could be supported. We independently analysed
our participants’ responses, then conferred in order to agree.
Since this was a qualitative study we, like Wash [48], do not report how many users
alluded to each of the explanations in their statements. We do attempt to give a flavour
of our findings, in order to allow the reader to understand the different mental models
that are revealed by our study.
In the following subsections we report on whether any statements made by the par-
ticipants support or challenge the explanations we advanced in Section 2. We also dis-
cuss the results in relation to existing findings from the literature. As described in the
study section, we performed the study with two groups: lay people and experts. We did
not detect any differences between the two groups, however, so the rest of this section
is an analysis of both the interviews and the surveys.
4.1 Explanation 1: No Privacy Awareness
A possible reason why E2E encryption is not widely used might be that people do not
have any awareness of privacy as a concern.
Analysis from interviews/survey. We did not find any general evidence for this explana-
tion from the interviews and surveys — the participants were indeed aware of the fact
that their privacy could be violated when using email. Quotes that support the case that
people are aware of privacy are:
“.. it kind of gets more into the privacy of people’s life, somehow”
“it’s just like a virtual ... loss ... of privacy”
“it’s about privacy concern and he is collecting data, and based on that data
maybe he is profiling”
“mitigate by not sending emails containing sensitive information.
In particular, general privacy-related violations were mentioned far more frequently
than specific concerns such as the integrity, authenticity and availability of email. There
is also some evidence that the NSA’s activities have had some influence as shown by
quotes like
“... NSA, a group of intelligence; they are just monitoring normal people”
Findings from literature. In the literature there are similar findings that people are more
aware of privacy violations than of any other type of violations [47]. Few people men-
tioned specific aspects such as integrity and availability in a study into online security
understanding [19]. In a study on connection security, people only considered confiden-
tiality and encryption in their definitions [18]. For smartphones the issue of theft and
loss made availability salient in a study on smartphone security [35].
Summary. While the majority appeared aware of privacy concerns related to email,
there was at least one who did not mention privacy, sensitive data, private data or any-
thing related to this.
4.2 Explanation 2: Privacy Aware, but Not Concerned
Another explanation that can be advanced is that they are not concerned about the prob-
lems even though they are aware of the potential privacy violations that can occur.
Analysis from interviews/survey. From the interviews and surveys, different reasons
have been identified that may help to explain why people may not see the need to protect
their privacy in the email context even though they are aware of potential privacy issues.
Relevant statements and corresponding quotes from the study are:
Theme 1: Nothing to hide: “And I don’t feel that I have something to [laughs] to
hide, though I don’t like people, uh, getting in my stuff”; “[I’m least concerned about]
[s]nooping. I think that unless I have something to hide it doesn’t bother me.”; “But in
general, I don’t know if that is that, uh, important or is it that interesting. I don’t know.
It, it’s not very sensitive, so the risk is not that high,”; “Given for me as a private person
because I don’t have, you know, so private data which I’m concerned about that no one
ever should read that and I—like 99% of my emails are just formal stuff ”.
Theme 2: No harm “But they are not affected directly.”; “Not to do any harm to
me, rather he is actually collecting data.”; “I think, umm, that would always happen, the
monitoring thing. So, I would say that yeah ... the, the hacking thing is more, more of a
concern.”
Theme 3: They don’t feel important enough “Emails of some high officials, high-
position officials in government so ... they may ... cause problems.”; “I think it just, um,
depends on your personality if you have someone famous.”
Theme 4: Private emails are not critical “I would be more concerned if it was my
official Inbox, of my company, but this I’m, I’m since I am a student and I am right now
only talking about my personal email box”; “I’m talking about personal emails there.”;
“So I think there are possibly two main cyber threats for me as a private person, and
then if you’re an institution or a business company, then there might be more”
Theme 5: Someone else’s responsibility “There has to be the clients, or the, the, the
person providing the client services is responsible for making sure that it’s secure. So
if you have a decent email service provider they should be able to ensure that you can
only see emails that are on your account and you only see emails after you’ve logged
on, and things like that”; ”You-the whole thing about not just email security but the
whole cyber security in general, you have to ... we’re most of the time at the mercy of
the people providing the service.”
Theme 6: Assuming that security is already taken care of “I’m not, I’m not aware
of any, sort of, like, when I’m sending just a general email, umm, I assume [laughs] that
it’s quite safe and it hasn’t been commandeered by an external source, or anything like
that.”; “That’s why it’s personal computer and personal email. That’s-I think that’s the,
the, the worst case scenario if every time I send an email or had a conversation online,
someone else can see it. It’s not good.”; “It works, but I suppose that the securities
during the, during that path we draw before, it should be really h-hard to break, first of
all.”
Findings from literature. Other researchers studying privacy issues in other contexts
such as social networks also concluded that there was often a mismatch between being
aware of privacy issues and taking action. Acquisti and Grossklags found that “even if
individuals have access to complete information about their privacy risks and modes
of protection, they might not be able to process vast amounts of data to formulate a
rational privacy-sensitive decision” [2]. Users might also be driven by immediate grat-
ification over rational decision-making [1]. Gross and Rosson [24] confirm the attitude
of generally feeling that security was the IT department’s job, not that of their study’s
participants.
Summary. There is plenty of evidence, both from our study and from the literature, that
if people are generally aware of privacy issues with email communication this does not
mean that they will expend the effort to protect their privacy. Thus, we can conclude that
this second explanation is indeed a feasible reason why E2E encryption is not widely
used.
4.3 Explanation 3: Privacy Concerned with Misconceptions
A third possible explanation is that users know that the privacy of their emails can be
violated but do not know that this can happen both in transit and at the mail server.
They may subsequently attempt to protect themselves against other types of threats and
might not use E2E encryption.
Analysis from interviews/survey. Analysing the interviews and the surveys reveals that
neither threats at the email server side in terms of either hacking the server or internals
having access, nor threats on the network, are those that are most often mentioned. The
threats that are most often mentioned are related to password security and malicious
attachments.
Theme 1: Password Issues: Quotes which clearly provide evidence that most peo-
ple have password problems in mind when thinking about how to secure email com-
munication are: “I think this is the main thing, related... basically, if your password is
secure with you, then I think your mailbox is secure.”; “If your password is... you know,
falls into the wrong hands... most concerned obviously is someone getting access into
my mailbox, obviously, by logging in”;
The responses to the question on countermeasures show that people mentioning
password-related threats also mention corresponding countermeasures such as: “Trying
to use as many different passwords as possible without keeping, uh, keep forgetting
them.”; “Good password, change password regulary.”; “Set a very good password, in-
cluding numericals and alphabets, lowercase, uppercase, special characters.”;
Theme 2: Malicious Attachment: Quotes indicating that people have malicious at-
tachments in mind when thinking about email related threat are: “files you don’t really
want to . you might receive viruses”; “if you open an attachment which includes viruses
or something like that”; “you can receive any virus”.
Similarly, responses to the question on countermeasures show again that people
mentioning malicious attachments also mention anti-virus software (e.g.“From the send-
ing side, well, you might actually, ahh, send something you’re not aware to send some-
how, ahh, or you might actually end up sending emails even though you don’t know it”)
or advocating careful usage as a corresponding countermeasure. Examples for careful
usage are: “Don’t open any emails from an unknown.”; “I do my own mental virus scan
in my limited abilities, in my head.”.
Theme 3: Further Mentioned Threats: Other mentioned threats not related to the
server or transit threats are:
– Concerned about security of end-point devices
“I’m not an expert at all but, ahh, got a virus, and for that reason it kept on sending
automatic emails from his ... his email address”, “But for some reason these random
emails pop up and ... on my Hotmail before. I had to cancel it because all these
people were getting emails from me that I had ... um, when I was in the military.
And they were all getting emails, and I hadn’t sent any emails.”.
– Concerned about someone having physical access to their device
“[A]t the university, sometimes I open my mailbox and I just forget to, ahh, sign
out.”;
“I work with my laptop, and sometimes I leave my laptop alone.”
Findings from literature. People in our study were most likely to mention password
security and virus as malicious attachments which is related to Wash’s [48] findings
on “names for viruses models about viruses, spyware, adware, and other forms of mal-
ware [were] which referred to [by everyone] under the umbrella term virus’” [48]. Also
related to Wash’s and others’ findings is that one of the issues with security is that peo-
ple’s s are incomplete i.e. they try to apply countermeasures against those threats they
are aware of and they think these will address all threats.
Finally with respect to encryption in particular, Garfinkel suggests that the trust
model of PGP (Web of Trust) is too hard for many users to grasp [21]. Keller et al.
[27] report that the detailed properties of the cryptographic primitives that are used in
public-key cryptography can be hard to grasp. Additionally the public-key infrastruc-
tures, on which many E2E encrypted email programmes are built, might be difficult to
comprehend: “[T]he usability problems uncovered in the Johnny user study were not
driven by the PGP 5.0 program itself, nor by the lack of training offered within the
program, but by the underlying key certification model used by PGP.” [21].
Summary. While this shows that when people are aware of a concrete threat, in this case
passwords being hacked and malicious attachments, they take or try to take remedial
actions. However, our analysis also provides evidence that some people are not aware
of any other threats and in particular are not aware of threats related to the server and the
transit. Correspondingly there is evidence for explanation 3, that many participants have
various (mis)understandings that direct them towards specific countermeasures that are
not relevant for adoption of E2E encryption.
4.4 Explanation 4: Privacy Concerned, with Sound Understanding, but Does
Not See Need to Act
The fourth possible explanation is that users know that the privacy of their emails can
be violated, and have a sound understanding that this can happen during transit or at the
Fig. 2. Understanding of the email architecture of participant B-24: “here be dragons”
mail server side, and also know that they can use E2E encryption. However, they do not
take any action for different reasons.
First, we validated whether there were actually people who were aware of threats
related to the server and transmission. There is strong evidence that at least some people
are aware of these threats as the following quotes show (as well as Figure 2): “I don’t
like my personal emails to be accessible by the email provider”, ”it’s always that they
have control on everything”; “It’s a bit strange that Google can read what I am, uh,
sending or, uh, receiving from-from friends, or-or-or partners or businessmen.; “The
data transmission in general, from server to Internet, should... could be, could be a
problem.”; “I would imagine it would be somewhere from leaving her computer to
being out here, and then before coming then in my computer.”
Analysis from interviews/survey. In order to validate this explanation from the inter-
views and surveys, we checked whether people who mentioned threats related to the
server or the transit necessarily saw the need to protect against these threats. We identi-
fied reasons why it might be worthwhile for people to take action themselves to protect
against hackers gaining access to the mail servers, against email service providers hav-
ing access, or even against anyone listening on the network. For each of the three themes
we provide quotes:
Theme 1: No need to protect against hackers gaining access “... or to the server,
but I don’t know how, ... how easy it is to ... have access in the whole server for a
company”; “With the cyber security in place, I think Gmail would not allow someone
to get into its stuff like that. So probably, I might be a little less concerned about that.”;
“I’m the least concerned about hackers. Okay. That’s mainly because I use two-step
verifica- verification on my email, and I will see if it works.”; “I think the server is most
sensitive one, but for me it’s less concern because, um, I care about the money I have to
pay and if I want it very secure I have to invest money.”
Theme 2: No need to protect against email providers having access in general...
“You can say that for security reason it might be useful” [having access to the e-mails];
“But sometimes it looks at patterns and words in the email. Most of them, they will
actually read the email. Maybe then scan through the message and they see things that
sound fishy, they, they can highlight to you that the message looks like it’s not very
genuine”
– ... as they only scan to enable targeted advertisements ... “Who can scan your email
and know the content. And then based an advertising”; “They you need to be able
to parse it, right, for targeted ads”; “Possibly least concerned is if something, uh,
if my email provider is reading or like scripting my emails and therefore showing
me possible or targeted ads. ... Because to be honest, if I don’t want them I’ll just
switch the email provider.”
– ... as they only access because security agencies require access: “[NSA] they re-
quested Facebook or Google to pass certain information so the problem can appear
here as well when they request them to release certain data or maybe my, ahh, email
service provider, they can also actually access my email and see what’s going on”
Theme 3: No Need to Protect against network related attacks “And there’s always
the chance that it could be intercepted and read, and maybe even duplicated and stuff
like that. [..] So I really don’t see that as a big problem.”
Findings from literature. There is an interesting aspect regarding paying for security
and how much people are willing to pay. Will they accept insecure or less secure ser-
vices as long as these are free? This has also been studied and presented in the literature.
“[I]ndividuals are willing to trade privacy for convenience or bargain the release of per-
sonal information in exchange fore relatively small rewards.” [2], and “Many perverse
aspects of information security that had been long known to practitioners but just dis-
missed as ‘bad weather’ turn out to be quite explicable in terms of the incentives facing
individuals and organisations, and in terms of different kinds of market failure.” [3]. Fi-
nally, the “nothing to hide” fallacy [45] comes across strongly. Conti and Sobiesk [12]
found that many of the respondents in their study also exhibited this perception.
Summary Our data provides evidence that this fourth explanation (that is, that users
know that the privacy of their emails can be violated, and have a sound understanding
that this can happen during transit or at the mail server side, but do not take any action)
is a viable explanation for the poor uptake of E2E encryption.
4.5 Explanation 5: Privacy Concerned, with Sound Understanding, but Does
Not Know How to Act
Another possible explanation is that while people are aware that their privacy can be
violated, are concerned about privacy problems, and see the need to prevent these, they
may not be aware of the efficacy of E2E encryption to protect their communications.
They may believe that other measures are efficacious. Because they do not know, or
are only partially aware, that they can use E2E encryption as a precaution, they do not
use/consider it but may consider other options.
Findings from interviews/surveys. The analysis of the surveys, in particular, revealed
a number of themes why people do not use E2E encryption although they see a need to
protect themselves (against server side privacy violations ans against network attacks).
The identified themes are ‘think there is nothing they can do’, ‘unclear about counter-
measures’, and ‘wrong understanding of encryption’. In the following we explain these
themes and provide quotes for each of the themes:
Theme 1: Think there is nothing they can do: Due to the lack of knowledge
about encryption and, in particular, about E2E encryption, some people believe that they
cannot prevent email providers from gaining access to their emails. Quotes providing
evidence for this theme are: “Is never gonna change.”; “There’s no solution for that.”;
“It’s always that they have control on everything.”
Theme 2: Other types of (more or less effective) countermeasures: “So whenever,
uh, I have to send some very, like, uh, highly, uh, you know, secret information, I do
not prefer mail. I prefer talking on phone; “Like to split up into different things, and
I would say that send some of them by Facebook, but some of them by emails; “I am
definitely not sending my credit card information or stuff like that or very-very personal
data within, um, an email. I try to do that personally or within different steps.”
Theme 3: Wrong understanding of encryption: Overall, only very few participants
mentioned the term ‘encryption’ at all. Most of those who mentioned it seem to have a
wrong understanding of encryption and in particular E2E encryption as the following
quotes show: “Definitely encrypt the email, make sure I knew it wasn’t a fake.”; “[I’m
aware of problems related to] firewall and cryptography, public and private passwords”
Of particular interest is this statement from one of the participants using https: “The
only thing that I use is I actually enable https for my Facebook, Gmail, etcetera. So I
use secured connection to login, so that like I use SSL and there... it’s a secure.”. This
is only a first step however, and only secures the connection between the device and
the mail provider but does not mitigate against the amail provider or any connection
afterwards as https might not be enabled.
Findings from literature. Wash [48] postulates that people had some idea of some kinds
of threats and tried to use countermeasures that they believed would address the threats
they were aware of. If their threat models are incorrect these countermeasures will prob-
ably not help, but the invisibility of breaches will keep them blissfully unaware of this.
Gross and Rosson [24] reported that the participants in their study had an incorrect and
dated understanding of the actual threats they were subject to. They seemed to conflate
security with functionality in many cases.
Summary. Based on the findings from the interviews and surveys, and the findings
in the literature, we can confirm the explanation that some people do not use E2E en-
crypted email because they are not aware, or do not understand, the protection tech-
niques that are available.
4.6 Explanation 6: Privacy Concerned, Wants to Act, but Cannot
In this subsection we analyse whether the theoretical explanation of “They know that
the privacy of their emails can be violated (transit/server) and they understand that they
can use E2E encryption to prevent this, but they are not able to use it”.
Findings from interviews/surveys. The analysis of the interviews and the surveys does
not provide much evidence that this is actually a reason, i.e. not being able to encrypt
was not something our participants complained about. The only related quote is:
“[Encrypting email is] less effective because not everyone knows to to user this
/ decrypt / etc.)”
The fact that participants did not mention more related issues might be because we did
not use the term “E2E encryption” in our questions and, in particular, we did not ask our
participants whether they ever tried to use E2E encryption or to relate their experiences
with using it. This omission was deliberate: we wanted to gauge their mental models,
not prompt them by mentioning E2E encryption.
Findings from literature. One of the mantras of the field of usable security is that
security systems are not used because they are too complicated, because people cannot
use them. Whitten & Tygar published their seminal “Johnny” paper in 1999 [50]. They
suggest that security software is intrinsically harder to use than “normal” software [50].
Many of the papers published about email encryption and the difficulties users ex-
perience with it make a basic assumption that the problem is that they can’t encrypt [50,
11, 44, 20, 52, 34, 43]. This suggests that the user wants to do something but is prevented
from doing so by the complexity of the system and the poor design of the interface.
Some researchers have worked on creating better interfaces to address this problem
[17].
Summary. While the Whitten and Tygar paper states that poor usability is discouraging
adoption, many people do not even reach this stage, and are stuck in different mindsets.
Thus, while users with good understanding and motivation may be foiled by poor user
interface design or a lack of technological support, many have different reasons for non-
adoption that will need to be resolved before contributions to the usability challenge
become meaningful.
4.7 Explanation 7: Privacy Concerned, Knows how to Act, Can Act but Does
Not
In this subsection we analyse whether the theoretical explanation of “They know that
the privacy of their emails can be violated (transit/server), and they understand that
they can use E2E encryption to prevent this, and they are able to use the tools, but
they get side-tracked for some reason.’ was mentioned by our participants or by other
researchers.
Findings from interviews/surveys. From the data we collected there is no evidence to
confirm this explanation.
Findings from literature. Users appear to have an over-optimistic bias in their risk per-
ceptions, especially with respect to information security. This self-serving bias is also
related to a perception of controllability with respect to information security threats,
i.e. what we control we consider less risky than that which we do not control [42, 37].
Furthermore, interoperability and availability of keys on different devices are issues
mentioned by [34]. Another possibility is that users are simply mimimising effort, and
encryption, being effortful, seems too much trouble.
Dingledine and Mathewson [16] studied the tendency of users to not use security
features. In general, in case of high effort and only a nebulous nature of the conse-
quences, it was not used. Unfortunately, it is difficult to compute the cost of security, or
even the lack thereof [28]. Furthermore, Gaw et al. [22] offers another potential reason.
In the analysed organisation where employees did have the knowledge and ability, email
was not universally encrypted. As reasons they identified that employees considered it
paranoid to encrypt all emails, suggesting a social element to their decision making.
Summary. While there is not much evidence from our interviews and surveys to support
this explanation there is some evidence from the literature supporting this explanation.
It is possible that we would also have identified similar themes from interviews if we
had included people who either do use, or have discontinued using, E2E encryption.
4.8 Summary & Discussion
Table 1 summarises our findings, in terms of whether our explanations were confirmed
by our studies and literature review, or not.
Proposed Explanation Literature Participant Statements
1. No Awareness (X)
2. No Concern X X
3. Misconceptions of How to Protect X X
4. No Perceived Need to Take Action X X
5. Needs to Take Action But Does Not Know How to Act X X
6. Inability to use E2E Encryption X
7. Becoming Side-Tracked X
Table 1. Support for the Seven Explanations
We were not able to find strong evidence for a non-awareness of privacy as an ex-
planation for non-adoption of E2E encryption. However, the gap between theoretical
and practical privacy awareness pointed out by Burghardt et al. [8] could be confirmed
in the context of email from our studies as increased awareness does not have converted
into widespread adoption of E2E email encryption. Their lack of understanding, mis-
conceptions and incomplete mental models of email security (refering to explanation
2-5) meant they did not even think about using E2E encryption. Correspondingly, it is
not too surprising that from the qualitative studies was that not being able or willing to
encrypt (poor usability - explanation number 6 and becoming side-tracked - explanation
number 7) was rarely mentioned by the participants. These misconceptions also explain
why people taking action to protect themselves mainly deploy (traditional) mechanisms
such as secure passwords, anti-virus software, and careful usage. From our data, we
identified three cross-cutting factors that could contribute towards the explanations we
cited in Section 2. The first contributory factor could be their lack of understanding,
misconceptions and incomplete mental models of email security might be that there
was, in general, very little understanding of how email was transmitted and stored and
how the email architecture works. We could observe this from their drawings - e.g. in
Figure 3 (computers directly connecting and email floating across to the recipient) and
Figure 4 (here the lock and key may indicate that users think that more technologies are
in place than HTTPS, and possibly have an expectation of end-to-end encryption) - as
well as from their statements:
Fig. 3. Examples from first set of drawings
Fig. 4. Examples from second set of drawings
“[I]t’ll go into the sky somewhere, and then it will [go] down to my computer”
“[I]t’s all an invisible process to me. The way that I understand is that you liter-
ally just click send’ then a second later it appears in their inbox [laughs].”
“Umm, well, yeah, this type of thing is actually, ahh, quite a ... a mysterious
thing for me.”
A second contributory factor might be that they lack understanding of the possi-
ble consequences of not protecting themselves. For instance, most of those who were
aware of email providers having full access to their emails rationalised this instead of
being concerned. They advanced several reasons for why this was acceptable, e.g. that
it facilitated scanning of emails which they considered needed to occur for security pur-
poses or to allow targeted advertisements (the price they pay for a free email service).
Others, with more understanding and a greater level of concern, often did not act to
protect their privacy because they considered it futile in the face of surveillance actions
by powerful governments. Interestingly, there did not seem to be significant differences
between mental models held by lay persons and computer science students taking part
in our study.
A third contributory factor that emerged from our data was that problems might be
attributable to the information sources that inform people generally. Our study provided
evidence for the fact that people gain knowledge primarily via stories told by others or
based on personal experience:
“I have friends that, uh, their per-their personal accounts w-was hacked.”
“And also I think I’ve heard from my friend that they could catch everything
from here [laughs] somehow.”
“[A friend] got a virus, and for that reason it kept on sending automatic emails
from his ... his email address.”
This would explain why many people seem to have an awareness of “good password
practice”, but not about privacy protection using E2E encryption, which has enjoyed
much less attention in the media.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
The Snowden revelations have highlighted the importance of end-to-end encryption as
a privacy preserving tool. We posed the question “Why is the use of end-to-end email
security so limited?”. In order to answer this question, we set out by proposing a devel-
opmental pathway, a progression to E2E encryption, comprising of seven explanatory
states.
We carried out a qualitative study (both semi-structured interviews and a survey) in
order to identify mental models from both lay persons and computer science students.
We considered that this study would serve to confirm or challenge our proposed expla-
nations. We also carried out a literature review to determine whether the explanations
could be verified from the established research literature. We did confirm four of the
seven explanations from our study, and an extra two from the research literature.
As future work it would be beneficial to come up with ways of ameliorating the
situation, finding ways of advancing users along the pathway to awareness, concern,
knowledge, understanding, usage, and eventual adoption. Since we identified flawed or
incomplete mental models in states two to five, specific questions that can be investi-
gated in future to address these mental model related issues could include:
– How can we help users to understand the threats to their emails?
– How can we elicit a sense of concern in end-users with respect to privacy violations
such that they make an attempt to explore privacy preservation tools?
– How can we communicate countermeasures and desirable precautionary behaviours
effectively?
– How can we dispel the “nothing to hide” myth, so that end users do indeed see the
need to act to preserve their privacy once they know how, i.w. better understand the
consequences at least in the long run?
– In general, how can we nurture and foster comprehensive and complete mental
models of E2E to ensure that users want to encrypt, know how to encrypt and, most
importantly, do encrypt.
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